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Let me start with a little story that shows how and why cantonal and municipal 
autonomy really works in Switzerland. I know a mayor of an average municipality 
in the eastern part of Switzerland with about 5000 inhabitants. 
With this mayor I recently had a discussion, if Switzerland should join the EU or 
not, and we also discussed the costs and benefits of membership – a very Swiss 
approach. We agreed that there are good reasons for scepticism and he conclu-
ded, that if we will join one day, it would not cost him more than about 15 Swiss 
Francs, which means about 10 USD. I asked him why, and he explained to me: “You 
know, in my office I have already two big waste-paper baskets for all the official 
mail I get every day. I have better uses of my time than reading it, and I mostly 
throw it directly into the waste-paper basket. I have one for all the forms, regula-
tions and other papers I get from the Cantonal Government, another one for every 
thing they send me from the Federal Government in Berne. And when we become 
a member of the EU I will need another waste-paper basket, for all the forms and 
regulations coming from Brussels. This will cost me about 15 Sfr, because I will 
need a very nice and big one...” Of course he may have exaggerated, but his muni-
cipal autonomy is based on financial and fiscal autonomy, which is very important 
and which explains why he can take the risk of ignoring the mail from the cen-
tral authorities. Our Swiss tax system is based on a three-level taxation, and the 
municipal level gets one third of the income taxes – directly from the taxpayers. 
So municipal authorities have “their own money”. They can spend it for the local 
public services, but they are controlled by the taxpayers, which are more or less 
identical with the users and the voters.
1.  Competition as a Procedure of Discovery 
There is no such thing as "the best solution“ of structural, financial and fiscal or-
ganisation of a state. The less state intervention the better. All we have at hand is 
the exchange of experiences based on differing historical contexts. Days of simple 
blind copying of "miraculous solutions“ from the USA are definitively over and all 
countries, including those of Western Europe, look also elsewhere for ideas. With 
great interest we observe how problems are solved in other parts of the world, 
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for instance in the New Europe and in Asia. Switzerland is a successful country, 
we have been very lucky to stay outside the two world wars of the 20th century 
and we are amongst the top ten in almost every type of rankings, e. g. economic 
freedom, per capita income, life expectancy and even happiness – if there is any 
rational method of measuring it, which I doubt. 
Here are in short the most important facts and figures. Switzerland has a population 
of 7 Million people, 20 percent of them have immigrated in the last 20 years.
As a whole we have more than 2000 municipalities in Switzerland and 25 Cantons 
of very different sizes. The smallest municipality counts less than 100 inhabitants 
and the biggest, the City of Zurich, more than 300 000.
We are not a member of the EU, which in my opinion is good for Switzerland and 
good for the EU. We cooperate on the basis of bilateral agreements and pay the 
price of not being on the table when the decisions are taken. But as a small and 
rich country you have always the risk of being in the wrong camp; you are outvoted 
when it comes to pay and you are outvoted when it comes to rule. 
The Swiss view on the EU can be characterized as follows: The institution is based on 
four ideas; two of them are good, two of them are bad or at least “old fashioned”: 
1) Peace, 2) free market – inside and outside, 3) harmonisation of complex systems 
or the centralized EU technocratic bureaucracy and 4) equalisation by subsidies, 
interventions and redistribution or the EU-welfare state.
The market is a school without teachers and the most important market is the mar-
ket of ideas. On this international market it is important to exchange ideas and to 
share the experiences of what works and what doesn’t work. It is more important 
than any type of public relation.
What is the secret of a successful country? I am quite often invited as a speaker 
on topics like “The secrets of the Swiss Success”? I think that one of the secrets is 
the discovery that there is no such a thing as one constructivist formula leading 
to success. The most important thing is to get more and more open-minded and 
ready to learn from other people and nations, and to communicate on the basis of 
peace, enlightened self-interest, contract and friendship. "The right way“ is to be 
found in the competition of ideas, models, suggestions and experiments. So I am 
here as a student and not as a professor. 
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2.  Confederation, federal state and centralized state
Germany is a quite centralized country and every federation, I don’t exclude Swit-
zerland and the US, moves from non-centralisation to centralisation. The difference 
between confederal, federal and centralised political systems is one of degree, but 
there is a principal difference too.
The principal one is that a confederation offers the right to peaceful secession, 
which means that you have much more autonomy and flexibility to define and 
redefine the basic rules of partnership. From this point of view it offers more ad-
vantages for the stronger and richer partner to be in a confederation than to be 
in a federation. 
But if the richer regions have the ambition to be the leader of a unified country, 
its money, its tax- and social security system, its capital and the power of the 
central government, they can favour the more centralist model. But the price of 
this model of predominance of one part of the country may be much too high. A 
potential dominator takes the risk of losing the spirit of cooperation, of friendly 
competition and even of peace.
Switzerland has an experience of transformation from a free community based on 
a complex network of political treaties and contracts, first to a confederation and 
at least to a federation. We have successfully avoided the model of leadership or 
predominance of one part of the country. The first period of nation building lasted 
about 500 years, the second 50 years – between 1800 and 1848.
The Swiss federal constitution is more or less a copy of the Constitution of the US.
But there are at least three important differences.
We have no powerful president, because this institution is based on the rotation-
principal like in the EU. It changes every year – one of the 7 Ministers is president 
- as the primus inter pares.
We have no powerful constitutional court like the Supreme Court in the US and 
the Bundesverfassungsgericht in Germany.
We have no federal officials on the cantonal and local level – the same principle 
as in the EU, e. g. no federal police. 
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3.  The Principle of subsidiarity
The principle of subsidiarity means: Common problems must be resolved at the 
lowest possible level. The higher level is to intervene only if social and political 
support is required.
The principle of subsidiarity has become topical since it was used as a corners-
tone of the EU Treaty of Maastricht and Amsterdam. Everybody speaks about it, 
but nobody actually knows exactly what it should mean. The Swiss subsidiarity is 
rather sceptical of the centre and, as this is very close to my heart, I would like 
to put forward some arguments for this kind of subsidiarity that asks for taking 
away power from the central state. The principle as such is based on a fundamen-
tal division of the individual, the state and the society. It is the opposite of the 
socialist and the national-socialist approach (which is in fact very ideologically 
very close of each other) that the community is always more important than the 
individual. Subsidiarity means that we have to try to find the solution of political, 
social and economical problems in the most private and the most local framework 
that is possible.
4.  Federalism and Subsidiarity
Both principles are open to interpretation and therefore often misused to justify 
a transfer of powers upwards.
However, all phrases like "being able to“, "the smallest possible“ or "efficiently 
fulfil“ need further elaboration. The principle can be endangered by "different in-
terpretations“ of conditions and efficiency definitions under which the higher-up 
rank is, after all, justified in taking over some powers. There are always so called 
“good reasons” for centralising. 
Numerous constitutions and written sets of rules often lead to a highly "homoge-
nised equal distribution“ of wealth and to large subsidies to problematic or mar-
ginal areas. 
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One of the weakest points in the German Constitution, the Grundgesetz, is the aim 
of offering equal conditions of life in the whole territory of the nation state. Maybe 
this is the true reason for Germany experiencing its current structural problems 
after 50 years of successful development. Interventionist and protectionist support, 
redistribution through regional, structural funds and massive subsidies are some 
of the favourite roles of the central government, and I include the EU Comission. 
Politics then degenerates into a general fight of all against all for more and more 
subsidies and interventions. It is the worst case scenario of the future of the EU. 
This is why I am sceptical of all forms of redistribution by the central government 
and especially of redistribution that takes place on the interregional level. Rela-
tively poor taxpayers of rich regions transfer taxmoney to relatively rich people in 
poor regions, which invest it again in rich regions. 
So it can be shown that a substantial part of the money from general taxation 
that subsidises the marginal regions ends up back in the centre. The only effect of 
interregional redistribution is to strengthen the dependency of the periphery on 
the centre and to stifle any beneficial competition between jurisdictions. But this 
would provide enough material for a separate paper, I merely wanted to allude to 
these problems here. 
.  Redistribution, Subsidiarity and the majority rule
Local autorities, financed from “above” or by the centre are usually dependent and 
corruptible. Time and time again there appear situations in political life where all 
active steps and policies achieve the very opposite of what they were hoping to 
bring about. The subsidiarity principle is thus often misused to "justify“ a transfer 
of powers upwards to reach an allegedly better solution. 
Things get even more difficult when the increased centralisation is "justified“ by in-
ability of the lower jurisdictions to provide sufficient financial backing for the task. 
A centralised system of taxation will obviously deprive the lower level of cantonal 
and municipal taxation, and it is obvious that such impoverished communities and 
regions will find themselves unable to raise their own taxation towards their own 
tasks. A route to centralisation of tasks is thus opened if we start by centralising 
the taxation system. It is obviously a strange system which collects the money 
centrally and decentralises only the tasks. 
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Perhaps the worst solution in this case would be an artificial decision from the 
centre about the distribution of money among the lower levels in a federal sy-
stem for the completion of tasks. The best solution, then, is not to centralise the 
taxation system at all and leave the lower jurisdictions in care of both the expen-
diture side and the taxation side. A failure on this account has often discredited 
the principle of subsidiarity. 
6.  The Future of Subsidiarity
Subsidiarity means priority for smaller or private units. It calls for decentralisati-
on, privatisation and deregulation. In the 21st century the concept of subsidiarity 
must be made more precise and radical to suit the current environment. These days 
the principle should be that any higher jurisdiction should give up its competence, 
powers, responsibility and financial backing to a smaller jurisdiction closer to the 
root of the problem as soon as there appears a first problem on the higher jurisdic-
tion in effective fulfilment of the tasks or financial affordability. I am fully aware 
that this is a bit of a utopia, for who has ever seen a layer of central government 
prepared for an "orderly demise“?! 
We should all stay optimists, but I try to be honest about the weak points in the – so 
called – Swiss model. We have not yet been able to stop the trend of welfarization 
and redistributionism, neither on the interpersonal nor of the interregional type. 
Both are very popular, more popular than all the rhetorics on decentralisation.
.  Non-Centralism and the tax system
There are four principles of a sound tax system: No taxation without representa-
tion; the more concerned, the more involved; no representation without taxation 
and no tax spending without tax paying. The tax system, the monetary system and 
the social security system are the realistic base of any political system, and the 
legislation on these matters is more important than the Constitution.
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In the historically crucial role that systems of taxation have played in the past and 
continue to play in the present, it is shocking how very little is written about them 
in a way understandable by the man on the street. There are whole libraries full 
of technical expositions of the most efficient or most yielding ways of taxing the 
population, as well as detailed guides of the best ways of legal and semi-legal and 
non-legal ways of tax-evasion from the other side of the barricade. What usually 
goes unnoticed is that the whole of political history is at least 50 percent also the 
history of the systems of taxation, and that most historical revolts and revolutions 
originally started as revolts against the system of taxation. A peaceful civil society 
can be characterised by a relative absence of explicit rules and technical prescrip-
tions about social infrastructure, where conflicts are solved privately under the 
rule of law between the affectors and the affected. 
8.  Reducing the tax burden
Three ways lead to a reduction of the tax burden: The reduction of interpersonal re-
distribution, the reduction of interregional redistribution and fiscal competition.
The financial system is an all-important part of the political and economical sy-
stem whose fundamental role is often underrated. The aim of the tax-system as a 
whole exercise is not to create some patchwork from year to year to provide, with 
a lot of improvisation, sufficient funds for the given year. 
The classical liberal objective is to limit clearly the access to the fiscal revenue 
and thus arrive at the best possible method of reducing the scope of the state and 
of improving the health of the economy as a whole. The bulk of the tax burden 
could be drastically reduced by a reduction of inter-personal and inter-regional 
redistribution and by a fiscal competition of municipalities, cantons, states and 
federations. 
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.  Tax competition and tax limitation 
by direct representation
The Swiss Tax system is competitive, divided among the levels of federation, can-
ton and municipality, and dependent on the majority decisions of the taxpayers. 
In Switzerland it is the citizens and taxpayers who decide in a direct democracy 
by a majority rule about the tax rate. Such a model cannot be directly applied to 
other systems and local conditions. Time and time again it is doubted that the go-
vernment can and should leave the “power to tax” in the competence of the citi-
zens themselves. The fact that the majority decides on the levels of taxation in all 
levels of the institutional hierarchy provides good grounds for not making the tax 
system overly progressive and inducing the richer end of the spectrum to leave if 
they cannot achieve lowering of their burden. In a competitive system there are 
good reasons to have only a very mild form of progression. One-member-one-vote 
rule can only be functional in a one-member-one-taxrate system. 
Competing systems of Swiss taxation and the division of direct tax revenue among 
all three federal levels (municipal, cantonal and federal) allow for a good field for 
experiments. It may not be completely and in every aspect optimal, but it works 
and we are able to combine a relatively low level of taxation with a good quali-
ty of public services and infrastructure. There is such a thing as voting by foot in 
Switzerland, especially in view of the small size of jurisdictions in the federation 
as a whole. Even then, a departure of an important rich taxpayer from an area 
usually leads to a substantial populist campaign in the media against “the rich” 
and in favour of a new more centralist system, where there is no possibility of vo-
ting “by exit”. The system of competing jurisdictions and competing tax rates may 
be one of the best systems, but it is not one of the most popular and – under the 
pressure of democratic decisions – not the most sustainable. Democracy has al-
ways a centralist tendency.
The Swiss taxation levels are providing many wealth-creators with a welcome 
refuge, and this country can make a profit out of the European overtaxation of 
the rich. Rich people are welcome in Switzerland. In no way do I feel any sense of 
guilt for this.
The more direct the democracy, the stronger will be the discussion about taxes 
and the uses made of them and the role of public officials in both these aspects. 
A mature taxpayer is then identical with the mature citizen who supervises at all 
times the value-for-money he gets from the public services, demands efficiency, 
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no wasting and transparency, and is prepared to react to any deficiencies in the 
system. 
10.  Competition as a procedure of discovery and learning
Admittedly, non-centrality can also have its disadvantages. The least efficient pla-
yer is worse off in a competitive field than he would have been under a centralist 
averaging system of "harmonisation“ of well-being.
Yet from the liberal point of view, there may be indeed some painful deficiencies 
in so called underdeveloped areas and the price of inequality may be quite high. 
Diversity is always connected with inequality. History keeps telling us, however, 
that these backward underdeveloped structures have turned into the modern and 
more effective ones in the end, bringing a very welcome spur of the general well-
being in their wake. Centralisation contains, however, the danger of "unifying all 
jurisdictions, all parts of a federal system, to the latest trend in scientific and poli-
tical errors and mistakes“. The classical liberals, the free marketers, do not assume 
a monopoly on the truth and on the correct practical solutions. 
What they do advocate, however, is a system with small competing units that 
commit a lot of different smaller errors and mistakes. In this kind of systems, the-
re is a chance for learning by comparing. This may be less of a risk than a highly 
centralised system, where big errors and mistakes are more dangerous. Learning 
by doing, learning by comparing, learning by taking risks and committing and ad-
mitting errors should be our common aim. The smaller the units are, which start 
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